PROSOCIAL PERSONALITY BATTERY (PSP)

Reference:

Description of Measure:

The authors define prosocial personality orientation as the lasting dispositional tendency for an individual to think about the rights and well-being of others, to feel empathy and worry for others, and to behave in a manner that benefits others. The measure is designed to capture this dispositional tendency (i.e., personality trait). The measure is made up of two factors:

1.) Other-Oriented Empathy – tendency to feel empathy and concern for others.
2.) Helpfulness – tendency (based on past experiences) to perform helpful acts.

The scale is made up of 56 total items. It uses a Likert-type scale with 5 answer-choices.

Abstracts of Selected Related Articles:


The dispositional and structural correlates of volunteerism were examined in a panel study. AIDS service organization volunteers answered questions about affect toward the organization, organizational commitment, motives for volunteering, and a prosocial personality orientation. These measures were used to predict 4 volunteer-related behaviors. Length of service was weakly correlated with the 3 other volunteer behaviors. Altruistic motives and prosocial personality characteristics predicted several of the volunteer behaviors. Initial levels of volunteer activity and organizational commitment also predicted final levels of volunteer activity, but these effects were mediated through intermediate levels of volunteer activities. The findings are discussed within the context of the volunteer process model and role identity models of volunteerism.


This article briefly introduces the criterion construct, citizenship performance, describes how this construct is different from task performance and presents a recently derived 3-dimension model of the domain. Evidence is then reviewed for links between personality constructs and citizenship performance. An update of the Organ and Ryan (1995) meta-analysis of personality-organizational citizenship behavior relationships suggests slightly higher correlations than those found in the meta-analysis and also indicates that personality, at least the conscientiousness and dependability constructs, correlates more highly with citizenship performance than with task performance. These results are discussed in the broader context of
building models of job performance and studying linkages between individual differences and relatively specific criterion constructs.


Current research on prosocial behavior covers a broad and diverse range of phenomena. We argue that this large research literature can be best organized and understood from a multilevel perspective. We identify three levels of analysis of prosocial behavior: (a) the “meso” level—the study of helper-recipient dyads in the context of a specific situation; (b) the micro level—the study of the origins of prosocial tendencies and the sources of variation in these tendencies; and (c) the macro level—the study of prosocial actions that occur within the context of groups and large organizations. We present research at each level and discuss similarities and differences across levels. Finally, we consider ways in which theory and research at these three levels of analysis might be combined in future intra- and interdisciplinary research on prosocial behavior.

**Scale:**

Please contact Professor Louis A Penner directly to obtain a copy.

http://chuma.usf.edu/~penner/altruismsurvey.htm
ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY SCALE

Reference:

Description of Measure:
A 20-item scale designed to measure altruistic tendency by gauging the frequency one engages in altruistic acts primarily toward strangers. Participants answer on a 5-point scale ranging from Never (0) to Very Often (4).

Abstracts of Selected Related Articles:


The relationship between altruism and antisocial behavior has received limited attention because altruism and antisocial behavior tend to be studied and discussed in distinct literatures. Our research bridges these literatures by focusing on three fundamental questions. First, are altruism and antisocial behavior opposite ends of a single dimension, or can they coexist in the same individual? Second, do altruism and antisocial behavior have the same or distinct etiologies? Third, do they stem from the same or from distinct aspects of a person’s personality? Our findings indicate that altruism and antisocial behavior are uncorrelated tendencies stemming from different sources. Whereas altruism was linked primarily to shared (i.e., familial) environments, unique (i.e., nonfamilial) environments, and personality traits reflecting positive emotionality, antisocial behavior was linked primarily to genes, unique environments, and personality traits reflecting negative emotionality and a lack of constraint.


Consistency of measures of a prosocial personality and prosocial moral judgment over time, and the interrelations among them, were examined. Participants’ and friends’ reports of prosocial characteristics were obtained at ages 21–22, 23–24, and 25–26 years. In addition, participants’ prosocial judgment was assessed with interviews and with an objective measure of prosocial moral reasoning at several ages. Reports of prosocial behavior and empathy-related responding in childhood and observations of prosocial behavior in preschool also were obtained. There was inter-individual consistency in prosocial dispositions, and prosocial dispositions in adulthood related to empathy/sympathy and prosocial behavior at much younger ages. Interview and objective measures of moral reasoning were substantially
interrelated in late adolescence/early adulthood and correlated with participants’ and friends’ reports of a prosocial disposition.


Five questionnaires measuring altruistic and aggressive tendencies were completed by 573 adult twin pairs of both sexes from the University of London Institute of Psychiatry Volunteer Twin Register. The questionnaires measured altruism, empathy, nurturance, aggressiveness, and assertiveness. The intraclass correlations for the five scales, respectively, were .53, .54, .49, .40, and .52 for 296 monozygotic pairs, and .25, .20, .14, .04, and .20 for 179 same-sex dizygotic pairs, resulting in broad heritability estimates of 56%, 68%, 70%, 72%, and 64%. Additional analyses, using maximum-likelihood model-fitting, revealed approximately 50% of the variance on each scale to be associated with genetic effects, virtually 0% with the twins' common environment, and the remaining 50% with each twins' specific environment and/or error associated with the test. Correcting for the unreliability in the tests raised the maximum-likelihood heritabilities to approximately 60%. Age and sex differences were also found: altruism increased over the age span from 19 to 60, whereas aggressiveness decreased, and, at each age, women had higher scores than men on altruism and lower scores on aggressiveness.
Scale:
Using the following scale, please select the category that conforms to the frequency with which you have carried out the following acts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Once</td>
<td>More than</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Very Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>once</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.) I have helped push a stranger's car that was broken down or out of gas.
2.) I have given directions to a stranger.
3.) I have made change for a stranger.
4.) I have given money to a charity.
5.) I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).
6.) I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.
7.) I have done volunteer work for a charity.
8.) I have donated blood.
9.) I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (books, parcels, etc).
10.) I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.
11.) I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (in the supermarket, at a copy machine, at a fast-food restaurant).
12.) I have given a stranger a lift in my car.
13.) I have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging me for an item.
14.) I have let a neighbor whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some value to me (eg, a dish, tools, etc).
15.) I have bought 'charity' holiday cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause.
16.) I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with an assignment when my knowledge was greater than his or hers.
17.) I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor's pets or children without being paid for it.
18.) I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.
19.) I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing.
20.) I have helped an acquaintance to move households.

Scoring:
Score scale as a continuous measure.
SOCIAL VALUES ORIENTATION (SVO)

Reference:

Description of Measure:
A 9-item measure of one’s social values orientation – defined as one’s stable preferences for distributions of important resources between others and oneself. The questionnaire aims to divide respondents into one of three categories: Altruist (or Prosocial), Egoist, Competitor, based on their responses. Each item asks participants to choose among 3 hypothetical self-other distribution options. The altruist response is the one where the participant maximizes the combined payoff for other and self. The egoist response is the one where the participant maximizes the payoff for self and disregards the payoff for other. The competitor response is one where the participant maximizes the difference between the payoff of other and self.

Abstracts of Selected Related Articles:

A persistent puzzle in the social and biological sciences is the existence of prosocial behavior, actions that benefit others, often at a cost to oneself. Recent theoretical models and empirical studies of indirect reciprocity show that actors behave prosocially in order to develop an altruistic reputation and receive future benefits from third parties. Accordingly, individuals should stop investing in reputations via prosocial behavior when a future benefit (via indirect reciprocity) is unlikely. The conclusion that the absence of reputational incentives necessarily leads to egoistic behavior contrasts sharply with models of heterogeneous social preferences. Such models demonstrate the theoretical plausibility of populations composed of egoists and altruists. Results of Study One show that actors classified a priori as egoists respond strategically to reputational incentives, whereas those classified a priori as altruists are less affected by these incentives. Egoists act prosocially when reputational incentives are at stake but not when opportunities for indirect reciprocity are absent, while altruists tend to act prosocially regardless of whether reputational incentives are present. These results suggest that altruistic behavior can result from non-strategic altruism or reputation-building egoism. Study Two replicates these results and explores indirect reciprocation of others’ prosocial acts. We found that altruists indirectly reciprocate at higher levels than egoists, and individuals tend to discount others’ prosocial behaviors when they occur in the presence of reputational incentives. As a result, public prosocial behaviors are indirectly reciprocated less than private prosocial behaviors. In line with our argument that altruists pay less attention to reputational incentives, egoists showed a greater tendency than altruists to discount others’ public prosocial behaviors. The results support the growing focus on heterogeneity of individuals’ social preferences in models of altruism and indirect reciprocity.

Two studies examined the choice differences between prosocials and proselfs by examining the influence of norms of social responsibility and reciprocity. In line with the integrative model of social value orientation, it was expected that prosocials differ from proselfs in their level of cooperation because they wish to maximize own and other's outcomes (i.e. paralleling the norm of social responsibility) and enhance equality in outcomes (i.e. paralleling the norm of reciprocity). Study 1 revealed that prosocials felt more responsible to further the group's interest than proselfs did and this social responsibility feeling appeared to account for choice differences. Study 2 revealed that prosocials were more likely to reciprocate their partner's actions than were proselfs. Also, feelings of social responsibility did not account for this observation, suggesting that enhancing joint outcomes and equality in outcomes constitute two relatively independent dimensions. The findings are discussed in light of the integrative model of social value orientation.


Interdependence theory presents a logical analysis of the structure of interpersonal situations, offering a conceptual framework in which interdependence situations can be analyzed in terms of six dimensions. Specific situations present specific problems and opportunities, logically implying the relevance of specific motives and permitting their expression. Via the concept of transformation, the theory explains how interaction is shaped by broader considerations such as long-term goals and concern for a partner's welfare. The theory illuminates our understanding of social-cognitive processes that are of longstanding interest to psychologists such as cognition and affect, attribution, and self-presentation. The theory also explains adaptation to repeatedly encountered interdependence patterns, as well as the embodiment of such adaptations in interpersonal dispositions, relationship-specific motives, and social norms.

**Scale:**

In this set of questions, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the “other.” Other is someone you do not know and that you will not meet in the future. Both you and Other will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce points for yourself and Other. Likewise, Other’s choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points Other receives, the better for him/her.

Here’s an example of how this task works.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>You Get</strong></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Gets</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and Other would receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and Other 500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and Other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives.

Before you begin making choices, keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers – choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have value: The more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the Other’s point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her.

For each of the nine choice situations below, circle A, B or C, depending on which column you prefer most. Please proceed in the order the choices appear.

1.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 480 | 540 | 480
Other Gets | 80 | 280 | 480

2.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 560 | 500 | 500
Other Gets | 300 | 500 | 100

3.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 520 | 520 | 580
Other Gets | 520 | 120 | 320

4.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 500 | 560 | 490
Other Gets | 100 | 300 | 490

5.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 560 | 500 | 490
Other Gets | 300 | 500 | 90

6.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 500 | 500 | 570
Other Gets | 500 | 100 | 300

7.  |   |   |
---|---|---|
You Get | 510 | 560 | 510
Other Gets | 510 | 300 | 110
8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You Get</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Gets</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You Get</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Gets</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring:**

“A person is considered to be altruistic if he or she has 6 or more prosocial responses.”

“A person is considered to be egoistic if he or she has 6 or more egoistic responses.”

“A person is considered to be a competitor if he or she has 6 or more competitor responses.”

Participants who do not have at least 6 of one type of response are usually not counted in the analyses.
PHILOSOPHIES OF HUMAN NATURE
ALTRUISM SCALE

Reference:

Description of Measure:

An assessment of one’s philosophy of human nature, particularly dealing with beliefs about altruism. This scale is 1 of 6 subscales of the complete Philosophies of Human Nature scale which has a total of 120 items (Wrightsman, 1964). The other subscales are: 1.) Altruism (see the altruism and prosocial behavior section of this website). 2.) Independence, 3.) Strength of Will and Rationality, 4.) Complexity of Human Nature, and 5.) Variability in Human Nature. The Trustworthiness subscale is made up of 14 items, 7 positive and 7 negative. Respondents provide answers ranging from -3 (disagree strongly) to +3 (agree strongly).

Abstracts of Selected Related Articles:


The study compares 57 homosexuals and 45 lesbians on six dimensions of beliefs about human nature. On only one dimension, altruism-selfishness, was a significant difference found. While there are no similar studies of the comparison of attitudes and values, the findings are consistent with the few personality studies which likewise reported no differences between homosexuals and lesbians.


Do individuals of differing religious orientations also differ in their philosophies of human nature? This question was examined by interviewing a representative sample of the adult population of Memphis, Tennessee. Altogether, 359 adults were questioned about their religious beliefs and practices, their answers yielding scores on four religious dimensions: Christian Orthodoxy, Church Involvement, Devotionalism and Theocracy. Respondents were also administered a revised version of Wrightsman's Philosophies of Human Nature Scale which produced scores on five dimensions: Cynicism, Internal Locus of Control, Goodness, Complexity and Variability. These two sets of measures were submitted to canonical correlation analysis. Two significant correlations were revealed, providing empirical support for the contention that people's religious outlook and their views of human nature are linked. The first canonical correlation of .35 (p < .001) suggested that people who adhere to orthodox Christian tenets, who make a habit of private devotions, and who are active in their churches see others as basically altruistic and truthful, hard to
understand, and externally controlled. The second canonical correlation of .21 (p < 
.01) suggested that high levels of religious activism (in terms of participation in both 
church activities and private devotions) are associated with a belief in the 
uniformity of human nature. The demographic background of people exhibiting 
these patterns of belief was explored in an effort to interpret the correlations

Bègue, L. (2002). Beliefs in justice and faith in people: Just world, religiosity and 
interpersonal trust. *Personality and Individual Differences, 32*, 375-382

Fifty-eight French subjects (28 women and 30 men, 16–65 years) from diverse 
occupational status completed Belief in a Just World Scales for Self and Others 
world, willingness to accommodate, and marital well being. *Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 22*(10), 1043–1056.] Belief in Immanent and Ultimate Justice 
in justice. In L. Montada, & M. J. Lerner, Responses to victimizations and belief in a 
just world (pp. 9–40). New York: Plenum Press], and a measure of Interpersonal 
Trust adapted from Wrightsman [Wrightsman, L. (1991). Interpersonal trust and 
attitudes toward human nature. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. 
Wrightsman, Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes (pp. 373– 
412). New York: Academic Press]. Religious commitment was also measured. As 
hypothesized, results indicated that Belief in a Just World (BJW) for Self, BJW for 
Others and religious commitment were positively correlated with Interpersonal 
trust (r=0.51, 0.54 and 0.34). No gender differences appeared on any scale. A 
regression analysis indicated that BJW for Others and religious commitment 
accounted for 36% of explained variance in the prediction of interpersonal trust.
Scale:
Instructions:
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by circling the number in front of each statement. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.) Most people try to apply the Golden Rule even in today’s complex society.
2.) Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble.
3.) Most people will act as “Good Samaritans” if given the opportunity.
4.) “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is a motto most people follow.
5.) The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.
6.) Most people with a fallout shelter would let their neighbors stay in it during a nuclear attack.
7.) Most people would stop and help a person whose car is disabled.
8.) The average person is conceited.
9.) It’s only a rare person who would risk his own life and limb to help someone else.
10.) It’s pathetic to see an unselfish person in today’s world because so many people take advantage of him.
11.) People pretend to care more about one another than they really do.
12.) Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people.
13.) Most people exaggerate their troubles in order to get sympathy.
14.) People are usually out for their own good.

Scoring:

Items 1-7 are positively scored items. Items 8-14 are negatively scored (i.e., reverse-scored). Keep scoring continuous.

Note: the 14 items should be randomly mixed up before using this scale.